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Abstract
Many security mistakes are made because of some underlying misconception about
computer security. These misconceptions can be remedied by developing curricula
targeting them, but they must first be identified. This paper outlines our process for
identifying common security misconceptions by surveying experts and coding their
responses and the results of that process. We also present open-ended questions
which are preliminary version of a computer security concept inventory based on
these misconceptions.
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1 Introduction
Despite advances in computer science education, computer security mistakes re-
main quite common. Many of these mistakes are made because of an underlying
misunderstanding about how security works. Subjects can be assessed regarding
their understandings or base concepts, and these misconceptions can be remedied by
creating a curriculum targeted towards them, but they must first be identified.
This goal of this work is to identify common security misconceptions by surveying
experts about common security mistakes they’ve observed being made by novices,
and coding those responses by underlying misconception in order to produce a list
of misconceptions well-supported by data. A concept inventory will be created with
questions to specifically assess each misconception. Finally, a curriculum will be de-
veloped to target these misconceptions with active learning modules and educational
videos.
This paper describes the motivation for our study, the process of creating, using,
and coding our survey, and our process of selecting and developing our list of miscon-
ceptions discovered through this process. We also discuss next steps and our vision
for the future of this work.
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2 Background
There are several integral concepts to understand for this work. First, it is im-
portant to consider survey design. We also have to understand how a coding process
works and how it can be evaluated. Finally, we need to know how to develop a
concept inventory based on a list of concepts. These concepts are discussed in this
section.
2.1 Concept Inventories
A concept inventory is a test designed to evaluate a student’s understanding of a
set of concepts. Concept inventories are usually presented in the form of a multiple
choice test. They can be administered post-course to verify students’ understanding
of concepts or both pre- and post-course to evaluate student learning. Distractors
are based on common mistakes, usually derived from an open-ended version of the
test. A score on a concept inventory should be a reflection of a student’s mastery of
whatever set of concepts are in the inventory.
The first concept inventory was the Force Concept Inventory (FCI), which tested
students’ understanding of Newtonian Physics[7]. Students held commonsense beliefs
about physics which were incompatible with Newtonian Physics. Students with these
beliefs failed to comprehend material in a physics course since they were learning on a
faulty foundation of knowledge. For example, a student might hold the commonsense
belief that heavier objects fall faster than lighter ones (even in a vacuum), based on
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their observations of objects falling while subjected to air resistance. However, in a
vacuum, objects of any weight or size will fall at the same rate. The Force Concept
inventory forces students to make a choice between Newtonian and commonsense
perspectives.
Concepts in a concept inventory are usually basic concepts in the field, not deeply
complex and specific pieces of knowledge. Hestenes, et al. found that many professors
considered the questions on the inventory too simple to be informative, but were
surprised at their students’ poor performance[7].
Almstrum, et al. outline a process for creating a concept inventory consisting of
five steps[1]. The first step is determining the concepts that will be on the concept
inventory. They suggest identifying concepts by surveying domain experts.
The second step is observing the process by which students misunderstand these
concepts, typically done via interviews of either individual students or focus groups
of students.
The third step is constructing the multiple-choice questions. This is usually an two
step process. First, researchers generate open-ended questions focusing on individual
concepts. Incorrect answers to these questions can be used to generate distractors
and possibly provide insight into new misconceptions. In addition, students can be
interviewed about why they believed their incorrect answers were correct. Then, data
gathered from the open-ended version of the concept inventory is used to generate
multiple choice questions .
The fourth step is the administration of a beta version of the concept inventory.
This step allows researchers to study the reliability and validity of the test. Reliability
is a measure of how consistently students will answer—how similarly will a student
answer the same question if they took the test twice? Validity is a measure of whether
the questions on the concept inventory reveal the misconceptions they are meant to
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reveal. Reliability can be statistically tested in results of administration of the concept
inventory.
Validity, on the other hand, is more difficult to evaluate. There are two types of
validity to check—content validity and construct validity. Content validity can be
verified by domain experts who review both the concept inventory’s creation process
and the inventory itself to see if it represents the domain well. Construct validity,
on the other hand, is concerned with whether or not each item measures what it’s
intended to measure. This can be done in several ways, including statistical analysis
showing answers to items about similar items are similar, analysis to correlate item
scores with other measures, and careful expert review.
The fifth step is to iteratively improve the concept inventory.
2.2 Survey
Kelly, et al. out several components of planning a good survey-based study[10].
The first component is planning the topics of interest. They recommend col-
laborating with domain experts, colleagues, and members of the target population
at this step in order to design good questions. Good questions should be properly
formatted with proper capitalization, numbering, and question grouping with clear
instructions. Double barrelled questions (i.e. asking two questions in one) should be
avoided. Leading questions should also be avoided. The survey should also avoid
having instructions that could bias responses.
Another component is piloting the study. In this step, beta testers should fill out
the study and provide feedback, which can be incorporated into the final survey. The
cover letter is another component, which should include some information about the
organization behind the study (including information about the researcher), details
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about how or why the interviewee was selected, goals of the study, and an explanation
of how responses will be used.
Sample size is an important factor to consider when conducting a survey-based
study. A qualitative survey typically needs less data than a quantitative study.
Malterud, et al. lay out a framework for evaluating necessary sample size of a
qualitative study[11]. Their framework looks at a metric they call information power
to calculate how large a sample is needed in a study. Information power depends on
five factors—aim of the study, sample specificity, use of established theory, quality
of dialogue, and analysis strategy. A study with a broad aim will need a larger
sample size than a study with a narrow scope. Specificity refers to specificity of
experiences, knowledge, or properties of the study’s participants. A smaller sample
size is needed where subjects have high specificity. Established theory asks about the
level of theoretical background of the study. Studies supported by a well-established
theoretical background require a smaller sample size than those that are supported
by less established theoretical backgrounds. Quality of dialogue refers to how well
interviewers and researchers communicate. Low quality dialogue leads to a higher
sample size being needed, and visa versa. Analysis strategy can be either case-by-
case or on a cross-case basis. Case-by-case analysis requires less participants than a
cross-case examination.
2.3 Coding
Coding is a process by which objective results can be drawn from subjective sur-
vey results. A coding process was outlined by Popping (2015)[13]. There are two
approaches to coding—one, the instrumental approach, approaches the data from the
researcher’s perspective during coding. The other—the representative approach—
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considers the respondent’s perspective when coding. Both of these perspectives—
instrumental and representative—can be incorporated in a single coding process.
In Popping’s process, coders independently generate codes for some subset of
the results, then merge the generated codes for a final list of codes[13]. The coders
then individually go over the entire data set, classifying each item using the list of
codes generated in the previous step. There are some potential pitfalls to avoid when
coding, such as including generating redundant, poorly defined, and/or non mutually
exclusive codes[13]. Another issue is coders having different interpretations of the
codes, an issue that can be somewhat alleviated during the generation of the final
list of codes[3]. According to Hak and Bernts, coders should avoid socializing with
regards to the coding as not to influence their coding[4].
It is important to evaluate inter-rater reliability. In other words, given the same
data, what was the variance in how coders classified it? An agreement metric such
as Cohen’s Kappa (for two coders) or Fleiss’s Kappa (for more than two coders) are
recommended[13, 14].
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3 Related Work
There have been several related works. Notably, several computer science and
cybersecurity-related concept inventories have been developed. Additionally, some
work has been done to identify common security advice and practices. We discuss
some of these works in this section.
3.1 Cybersecurity Assessment Tools (CATS)
The Cybersecurity Assessment Tools (CATS) project aims to develop a set of
tools intended to measure the quality of introductory cybersecurity courses[16]. One
of these tools is the Cybersecurity Concept Inventory (CCI). The CCI is meant to
evaluate students who have taken a single security class. The first step in their process
for developing the CCI was to identify core security concepts through the use of a
Delphi process, followed by student interviews to help understand why these miscon-
ceptions occurred. The CATS project is also working on a Cybersecurity Curriculum
Assessment (CCA) project, meant for graduates of a security program. There were
two simultaneous Delphi processes, one for the CCI and one for the CCA. Initially,
the results of both Delphi processes were highly similar, so the CCI Delphi process
was re-done with an emphasis on adversarial thinking. Thirty-six experts participated
in the Delphi Process, all of whom had a PhD and were either working in or teach-
ing cybersecurity. The restarted CCI Delphi process yielded 30 main areas of focus
within cybersecurity, of which they focused on the top five. The five concepts the CCI
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focuses on are “Identify vulnerabilities and failures”, “Identify attacks against CIA
[Confidentiality Integrity Availability] triad and authentication”, “Devise a defense”,
“Identify the security goals”, and “Identify potential targets and attackers”. Using
twelve fictional scenarios as the interview basis, twenty-six student interviews were
performed to see how students reasoned about different concepts.
The CCI draft was then generated. Each of the draft’s thirty questions was
assigned to one of twelve fictional scenarios. These questions have only one correct
answer, and distractors are inspired by the student interviews. Questions relate to a
single concepts, although a single concept may be addressed by multiple questions.
The process of validating the CCI is ongoing. A pilot study with 20 experts and at
least 200 students is planned, the results of which will guide improvements to the
CCI. They will then administer the CCI to at least 1000 students and analyze the
results. Psychometric testing, cognitive interviews, and expert reviews will follow.
The final test will likely consist of 25 questions—five questions for each of the top
five areas.
At the time of this writing, the CCA is still in active development, but is nearing
readiness for pilot testing.
3.2 Introductory Programming Concept Inventory
Caceffo, et al. developed a concept inventory for introductory programming us-
ing Alstrum, et al.’s method [2]. They first identified fundamental concepts. Then,
through analysis of exams and instructor interviews, they identified misconceptions
and potential distractors. In an iterative process, they produced open-ended ques-
tions, where students’ wrong answers led to better distractors and potentially new
misconceptions. After several iterations, they will have enough distractors and mis-
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conceptions to generate the final concept inventory as a multiple choice test. The
proposed concept inventory consists of 21 multiple-choice and open-ended questions.
As the concept inventory is still in the developmental phase, it has not yet been
validated.
3.3 Digital Logic Concept Inventory
A digital logic concept inventory (DLCI) was developed by Herman et al.[5]. They
used a previously compiled list of misconceptions, a survey of instructors, student in-
terviews, and student responses to the alpha version of the DLCI to create the concept
inventory. Base concepts to be evaluated by the DLCI were gathered from a group
of instructors using a Delphi process. The DLCI contains multiple questions testing
each concept in order to boost the test’s reliability. Distractors each correspond to
one student misconception (derived from student interviews and incorrect answers on
the alpha version of the concept inventory). In some cases, where concepts only had
one misconception, questions on the DLCI would address multiple misconceptions in
order to have enough misconception-based distractors[5]. The DLCI consists of 15
items. In a follow-up paper, the authors present a framework for evaluating concept
inventories and use this framework to verify the DLCI’s validity and reliability[6].
3.4 Operating Systems Concept Inventory
A preliminary concept inventory for operating systems courses was created by
Webb and Taylor[17]. Concepts were based on the authors’ experience on what
areas students tended to struggle in. Distractors were based on common student
misconceptions. The concept inventory consists of ten questions and continues to
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be refined. The authors propose statistical validation of the 10-question concept
inventory after its completion.
3.5 Expert vs Non-Expert Security Advice and Prac-
tices
In addition to the various related concept inventories, there has also been some
work investigating important security advice and knowledge. Done by researchers
at Google, this work compares common security advice and the security practices of
both experts and laypeople.
The Google researchers set out to answer two major questions. First, what advice
would security experts give to non-experts? Second, what are the differences between
the security practices of experts and non-experts? Lay people were considered non-
experts, and people with 5+ years of computer security experience were considered
experts.
To answer the first question, they surveyed 231 experts recruited via Google’s
Google Online Security Blog and through social media. Responses to an open-ended
question “What are the top 3 pieces of advice you would give to a non-tech-savvy
user to protect their security online?” are examined. A coding process was used to
identify pieces of advice. First, the list of codes was generated. Next, the two coders
both coded the same 10% subset of the data and examined their inter-rater reliability,
achieving a Cohen’s Kappa of 0.77. Next, the coders each independently coded half
the data. The result was 837 codes assigned to each of the 231 responses (in some
cases, more than three pieces of advice were identified per response). The 152 unique
codes were then grouped by category and sub-divided by support. There was little
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consensus among the experts on what advice was important and high priority[15].
The second question was answered with another survey question, which read
“What are the 3 most important things you do to protect your security online?”.
This question was asked of the 231 experts and 294 non-experts on Amazon Mechan-
ical Turk (MTurk). They found that the security practices of experts and non-experts
differ significantly, and that while expert practices are generally in line with expert
advice, non-expert practices are of mixed effectiveness[8].
They also outlined some guidelines for providing effective advice. Good advice
should be effective (if followed, it should have the desired outcome), actionable (should
be possible to do without being overly difficult), consistent (consistent with other
advice and consistent in that the advice itself does not constantly change), concise
(should be as small as possible). They acknowledge a trade-off between generic and
specific advice. Generic advice tends to be more concise but can require skills and
judgement that the advisee doesn’t have, while specific advice might fail to address
issues that are similar to the issue it addresses, but not exactly identical. For example,
saying that vegetables are healthy is overly general—a diet of fried potatoes follows
this advice but is not considered healthy. On the other hand, the advice that raw
broccoli and kale are health is overly specific and does not mention that raw spinach
is healthy as well. Some balance between general and specific advice is necessary.
The two may be combined by first offering some generic advice followed by specific
advice related to it for common situations.
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4 Methods
At a high level, this work consisted of three parts. First, there was a survey,
in which experts were asked to identify common security mistakes that they’ve ob-
served. Second, there was a coding process by which misconceptions were derived
from the mistakes experts reported. Third, there was the process of determining
which misconceptions were highly supported and describing them.
4.1 Survey Design
The goal of our survey was to gather a list of common mistakes security experts
observed being made b y novices. Two approaches were considered. The first was
for the researchers to come up with a list of expected security misconceptions and
have experts rate them by how common they were. The advantage of this approach
is that it could have been easier for experts to rate items on a list than to come up
with their own mistakes or misconceptions. The disadvantage of this approach was
that we might leave out valuable mistakes that the experts had observed but that
the researchers would not think of. The second approach was to ask researchers to
come up with common security mistakes. This approach would allow each expert’s
experience to be represented in the final list of misconceptions, but it could be harder
for experts to come up with mistakes they have observed. In the end, we chose the
second approach so we could capture as much of each expert’s experience as possible.
The survey started with a cover letter, explaining that the goals of the study, as
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well as a description of what the study would be asking about. An example of a
misconception from physics was used to avoid priming respondents with a security-
related example. There was also an informed consent page where researchers were
identified and information was provided about how their data would be used, how long
it would be retained, and so on. This page also contained a box respondents had to
check if they were willing to have their data included in the study. The confidentiality
of responses was also assured—direct responses were not quoted anywhere in this
study, nor will they released.
Designing appropriate questions was a challenge. On one hand, a single question
such as “What are common computer security mistakes you have observed?” could
be too vague and might generate only a fraction of the potential responses from each
participant. An expert might think of a mistake they encounter daily, but might not
have other mistakes come to mind in other areas of security. On the other hand,
asking highly specific questions might shoehorn experts into specific fields instead of
giving them the freedom to address mistakes in fields that weren’t mentioned in the
survey.
Another issue was that it’s often easy for people to identify mistakes that they see,
but can be difficult to generalize from a particular mistake to a broader misconception
or pattern. We didn’t want experts to be put off by that challenge. We decided it
would be most valuable to have people identify as many security mistakes as they
could and use our coding process to extract the underlying misconceptions. We also
made it clear that the goal was to uncover misconceptions, and invited experts to
articulate them on the survey if they could.
After considering the aforementioned issues, we decided to ask about six funda-
mental areas in computer security as a way to jog the imagination of our experts
while staying fairly general. These areas are: ”Network Security”, ”Application Secu-
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rity”, ”Data Security and Encryption”, ”Physical Computer Security”, ”Information
Privacy”, and ”Access Control”. The security areas were adapted from Wikipedia’s
list of computer security areas[18]. We added an ”Other” area as a catch-all in case
experts saw common mistakes that they felt didn’t fall under any of the categories.
We asked several security experts if they felt any major categories were missing from
the list, but they did not identify any additional areas.
For each category, we asked two open-ended questions, expecting answers in long
text form. The first question was “Can you think of any security misconceptions or
mistakes you have observed in $AREA?” and the second was “Why do you believe
these misconceptions or mistakes occur?”.
One way we tried to mitigate the difficulty of answering open-ended questions,
as well as respecting our experts’ time (and potentially their privacy), was to make
every question on the survey optional. If experts did not have a mistake in mind for
a particular area, they could simply leave it blank. The purpose of categories was to
jog respondents’ memory, not to sort their responses, and all responses were coded
together.
We will describe our use of a coding process to analyze the results from the first
question to identify the most commonly mentioned misconceptions later in this paper.
The second question on the survey (Why do you believe these misconceptions or
mistakes occur?) existed so that we could compare our results to our experts’ intuition
about root causes of the misconceptions, and to use them to flesh out descriptions of
highly supported misconceptions and design the interventions.
Finally, there were some optional demographic questions. We asked for education
level, which we split into nine categories (less than high school, some high school,
high school diploma or GED, some undergraduate education, undergraduate diploma
(2 or 4 year), some graduate school, master’s degree (or equivalent), and PhD (or
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equivalent), as well as an “other” section. We also asked ”What degrees or certifica-
tions do you have (if any)?” and ”What was/were your major(s)/minor(s) (if any)?”.
The next question is ”In what sector do you work?” and has five options (Education,
Industry, Government, Defense, and Other). Then we asked ”What is your primary
job responsibility?”, which gives five 5 options (educating others, security research,
applied security, consulting, and other). We also asked for how many years of expe-
rience in the field there are ”How many years of information security experience do
you have?” with six categories (1-5, 6-10, 11-15, 16-20, 21-25, 25+). We also asked
for an email address, if the participant is willing to receive follow-up communication
about the study (”Please enter your email address if you’re willing to receive follow-up
communication about this survey”).
Appendix A.1 contains the full text of the survey.
What sample size was needed for this survey? We analyzed the study using Mal-
terud, et al.’s information power metric[11]. We saw that that our study had a broad
aim, because we were asking about the entire field of computer security. Partici-
pants, who were specifically chosen because they are security experts exhibited high
specificity. In terms of theory, while there have been a limited number of studies
specifically looking at computer security misconceptions, there is a strong theoretical
background for this coding process, concept inventories, and computer security. In
this study, we did not consider dialogue quality in the same sense as Malterud, be-
cause there was not interview-style dialogue. However, because subjects could answer
whatever they wanted, and questions were open-ended, we postulate that the qual-
ity of dialogue was rather high—if there was anything a subject wanted to mention,
they were free to do so. Finally, our analysis strategy was cross-case, so we required
more subjects. Practically speaking, how much data did we actually need? While
the framework does not provide specific sample size recommendations, we know that
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because we had high information power, we needed a relatively lowered sample size.
The survey was sent to around 40 security experts who volunteered to beta test it,
of which around 10 responded. After accepting some minor revisions to demographic
questions, the survey was hosted on through Google Forms and was left open for
around two months, from September 2018 to November 2018. The survey was not
substantially changed after the beta testing process, so the beta testing responses
were included with the rest of the survey responses.
4.2 Finding Survey Experts
We went through conference proceedings for three security and security education
conferences (Usenix, ASE, and 3GSE) and found names and email addresses of as
many presenters as we could. As emails are not provided within the conference
proceedings, this involved searching for names and affiliations and manually finding
email addresses. In some cases, email addresses were listed directly on personal
webpages. In other cases, we examined things like git commit history on GitHub
accounts to identify email addresses. In total, we gathered the email addresses of
2500 academic experts. We also identified 254 industry experts from the Twitter
information security community.
The 2500 academic experts were sent the survey via email. For the industry
experts, 169 were contacted via email, and the rest were contacted via Twitter Direct
Message. The survey was sent to a total of 2754 participants.
An identical yet separate survey was posted to several public security-related
forums. Responses to this survey were kept separate from those to the emailed survey
because it was not possible to verify the respondents were actually security experts,
and to prevent any malicious entries from contaminating all the data. With one
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exception (discussed later), we ended up combining the responses from both surveys
in our analysis of the data.
4.3 Coding Process
Our coding process was based on the process outlined by Popping, with some
variation [13]. In Popping’s process, coders independently generate codes, merge their
codes, then re-code the data using the newly generated codes. In our process, coders
first generated their individual codes and independently coded the entire dataset.
Then, a final list of codes was generated, which consisted of every individual code with
a support count of three or more. As this work is only considering top misconceptions,
three was chosen as a threshold where anything with a support count lower than three
would not have been one of the most highly supported misconceptions. The codes on
the final list were then merged so there was one final list of codes. Coders defined
a mapping between their individual codes and final list codes. Coders evaluated
codes with support counts of less than three to see if they would better map to a
misconception on the final list and defined that mapping if they did. If not, these
codes were deemed not well-supported enough to be considered. A script was then
used to translate all the coding sheets to the final list of codes using these mappings.
We consider misconceptions where a majority of the four coders had a support count
>= 3 to be the most highly supported misconceptions we discovered.
Great care was taken by coders not to socialize with regards to the coding so the
process was as unbiased as possible. Coders were each given their own copy of the
data and instructed not to discuss the coding with others until it was finished. Coders
also refrained from referencing lists or papers about common security mistakes so as
not to influence the coding.
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Inter-rater reliability was then assessed on the re-coded data using Fleiss’s Kappa.
4.4 Creating Misconception List and Open-ended
Stems
We wanted to create well-defined misconceptions. For each of the supported mis-
conceptions from the coding process, we developed a concise statement of the miscon-
ception followed by a paragraph description of the misconception. The descriptions
were developed by a group of seven researchers who individually worked on the de-
scriptions and met weekly to review their work. Assigned descriptions were then
rotated so researchers could work on all the descriptions. Open-ended stems were
created using the same method of individually working on scenarios and questions,
meeting to review, then rotating misconceptions.
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5 Results
In this section, we discuss the results of the survey and coding process. Stastical
validation of the concept inventory is also provided. This section also provides a
review each of the highly supported misconceptions we discovered.
5.1 Survey Results
The expert survey received 75 responses, and the public forum survey received 14
responses. As all the public survey responses appeared reasonable (with the excep-
tion of one respondent, who reported no significant security experience, and whose
responses were not considered), both the expert and public survey results (88 in total)
were coded together. Each respondent had seven fields to enter data, corresponding
to the questions in the survey. Discounting empty rows, we had 469 total data points.
In the expert survey, the majority of respondents (74%) reported having a PhD or
equivalent degree. 8% reported having a masters degree or equivalent. The majority
(68%) also worked in education, with 15% reporting working in the industry. 48%
reported their primary responsibility as security research, 26% reported education
as their primary responsibility, and 10% reported that their responsibility was in an
applied security role. In terms of experience, there was a fairly normal distribution
between all experience levels. No respondents reported an experience level of less
than 1 year. 16% reported 1-5 years, 24% reported 6-10 years, 29% reported 11-15
years, 13% reported 16-20 years, 10% reported 21-25 years, and 9% reported having
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over 25 years of security experience.
We received thirteen responses to the public survey. Of the respondents, 25%
were reported having a Masters degree, and another 25% reported having ”some un-
dergraduate education”. Another 16% reported having an undergraduate degree or
”some graduate school”. The remaining respondents either went to trade schools, vo-
cational programs, or marked ”N/A”. 50% of the respondents worked in the industry,
20% worked in defense, 10% worked in Aerospace, 10% in Education, and 10% were
not currently employed in a security position. Around half had some sort of extra
certifications, such as CISSP, Comptia Sec+, CCNA, etc. Half of the respondents
reported 1-5 years of security experience. A single respondent reported not having
significant security experience. The responses for this respondent were not considered
when coding the results of the survey and their responses are not referenced in figures
or elsewhere in this paper. The remaining 42% of respondents to the public survey
had over five years of computer security experience.
5.2 Coding Results
We ended up with 17 misconceptions supported by a majority of coders. Figure
5.2 shows the full list of misconceptions—supported misconceptions are those with a
support count of three or more.
5.3 Statistical Validation of Coding Process
Fleiss’s Kappa was used to evaluate inter-rater reliability of the coded data, finding
k=.40, which is considered fair agreement.
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Figure 5.1: Breakdown of survey participants by information security experience.
5.4 List of Supported Misconceptions
In this section, we provide a statement of each of our 17 highly supported mis-
conceptions along with an explanation of the misconception.
5.4.1 As long as I’m using encryption, my data is secure.
This misconception is the belief that data is secure as long as encryption is being
used. However, it fails to consider the limitations of encryption. For instance, data
may be encrypted in transit but not while “at rest” (on storage media, a remote server,
or in backups). It might not be clear to individuals how encryption schemes can be
circumvented—for example, assuming that HTTPS is always secure, or that traffic is
always secure when connected to a VPN. People who hold this misconception may also
believe that cryptography automatically does things it simply doesn’t, like guarantee
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Figure 5.2: Full list of codes and their support counts
data integrity or authenticity. They might also fail to recognize that while encryption
may hide the content of messages, in many cases it does not hide metadata about
the communication or other externally-visible properties, such as the length of the
message, the time between messages, similarities between portions of the messages,
and so on.
5.4.2 Physical security is not as important as non-physical /
technical security.
People often view security as a software problem with software solutions. How-
ever, physical security issues cannot be entirely solved by software – they commonly
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require physical solutions (e.g., armed guards, locks, and tamper-resistant hardware)
or responses. Ultimately, people who hold this misconception view physical security
as less important than its software counterparts. As a result of this belief, they also
believe that physical security breaches are less severe than software-based ones, but
this is also untrue. Many software-based security solutions depend at least partially
on physical security and can in many cases be bypassed with physical access. For
example, password protections can often be circumvented by taking the hard drive
out of computer and mounting it under a different OS, communication media can be
compromised by installing a keylogger or network sniffer, keys and passwords can be
acquired from individuals through threats or physical force, and content controls can
be bypassed using cameras or other ”analog logs”.
5.4.3 I am not a target of cyber attacks.
People often think that since their individual data or information isn’t “valuable”
to anyone, no one would want to steal it. However, in the age of ransomware, people’s
data is as valuable to attackers as it is to the victims – as long as you’ll pay to get
it back, your data is a target. Similarly, some people seem to think that data is the
only motive for a cyber attack. Instead, attackers may want to use a computer’s
resources, whether it’s processing power for mining cryptocurrency or network band-
width used for denial of service attacks or spamming, a computer’s resources are
valuable to attackers. Cyber attacks can also be automated, indiscriminate attacks
that does not specifically target somebody, but victimize them nonetheless. Given
these motivations, most people are likely victims of a cyber attack at some point[9].
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5.4.4 Following good password practices is not important.
Victims of this misconception don’t follow good password practices. They may not
understand why their practices are insecure. For example, they may not understand
that password reuse is bad, because if a reused password is leaked, all affected accounts
will be vulnerable. They also may not understand what makes a password weak—
passwords that would be “hard” for a human to guess may be easy for a machine
to guess (whether they are weak to brute-force or to an attack via wordlist). They
might never change their passwords, not recognizing that the longer a password is in
use, the more likely it will be compromised. They might write passwords down in
obvious places, not thinking that anyone would find them (or care to use them). The
truth is that following good password practices can help keep accounts safe and are
important to follow.
5.4.5 This configuration works, so it’s probably secure.
Many people mistakenly conflate something working with it being secure. Software
often has either default or example configurations that are easy to get working. These
configurations are often not designed with security in mind and can include default
passwords and credentials or leave security features disabled for ease of use. A related
issue is that users may be aware that a configuration is insecure and intend to secure
their system later, but they forget to do it. People might also not be aware of all
the behaviors or options of software or devices that they’re using, which can make it
hard to fully secure them. In reality, it’s important to remember that just because
something works doesn’t mean it’s secure.
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5.4.6 You can be completely anonymous on the internet by
using privacy software and practices.
People holding this misconception put too much faith in the ability of privacy
tools, and often do not understand their fundamental limitations. In reality, while
these tools can increase your level of privacy, there is no way to be certain that you are
anonymous on the internet. For example, The Onion Router (TOR) is considered the
gold standard for anonymous internet browsing. However, if an attacker can control
both exit nodes a user is using, they can tell what the user is browsing. While these
attacks are considered theoretical, they highlight the fact that no privacy solution is
guaranteed to always work.
5.4.7 The software I use is secure, since the developers de-
signed it with security in mind.
People who hold this misconception put too much faith in software producers,
assuming that those producers thought about security and did a good job building
it into their product. Unfortunately, software is not always designed with security in
mind, due to developers’ lack of security awareness, ability, economic constraints, or
other reasons. Additionally, developers might have carefully considered security, but
simply made mistakes in the design or implementation phase. Or, they might have
done a good job, but other conditions change resulting in security vulnerabilities
(e.g., Meltdown). Novice software developers might even have this misconception
about their own software, because they tried to create it to be secure. Whatever the
reason, it is always a mistake to assume that software is secure.
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5.4.8 Having security product X makes me secure.
Some users believe having a certain security product, such as anti-virus software,
firewalls, or other security solutions makes them perfectly secure. Feeling secure, they
might participate in risky activities, such as downloading and executing software from
untrustworthy sources, thinking that their security controls will keep them completely
safe. In reality, these products are often imperfect and always have to be used as part
of a holistic security solution consisting of a combination of security defenses, policies,
and practices with the knowledge that no security solution is perfect.
5.4.9 Humans are rational agents who understand security
and can’t be tricked.
This misconception is people making assumptions about themselves or others,
such as “I won’t fall victim to X scam or social engineering attack”. People also
make these assumptions when designing security policies, assuming people will act
rationally, expertly and/or according to policy. Among other factors, inconvenience,
time pressure, or authority structures can cause people to circumvent or disobey
security policies. People might decide not to verify something and just assume it’s
OK, either because it’s inconvenient to verify or because their attention is drawn
elsewhere. In contrast, a realistic view of the limitations, weaknesses, and pressures
facing ourselves and others is critical for building security mechanisms and policies
that work in reality.
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5.4.10 I don’t have to assign separate privilege levels because
I can trust people to only do what they’re supposed
to.
People who believe this misconception think that trust in users (e.g., local people
in an organization and/or remote users of a program or system) or components of
a system is a valid replacement for robust security controls. However, this idea
breaks down whenever any person takes an action that violates this assumption,
either intentionally (they are a bad actor) or unintentionally (they make a mistake).
In essence, this misconception is not following the principle of least privilege, which
says that people should get no more than the minimum permissions necessary to
accomplish their tasks. Taking away any additional permission should break the
system. A good way of building policies like this is to start from no permission
(“deny by default”) and then add only necessary permissions (privileges, features,
etc.) until the system works as required. Following this principle can avoid both
malicious unauthorized access and accidents.
5.4.11 Anonymized data can’t leak sensitive information.
People who hold this misconception believe that anonymized data can’t leak any
sensitive information. However, data can be aggregated to reveal patterns or cross-
referenced with other sources of information to de-anonymize individual records or
reveal data about a population. For example, Netflix released a dataset for develop-
ment of a better video recommendation algorithm. While the data was anonymized,
it contained user reviews which cross-referenced with public movie review databases
to de-anonymize those users[12].
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5.4.12 Keeping a processes secret is vital to its security.
Victims of this misconception believe security by obscurity is a strong strategy.
It is better to use a public process that’s robust against attacks. This does not mean
there cannot be any secrets in the process. Rather, it means that the secrets are
separated from the process, so someone observing the process won’t be able to get
the secrets. For example, writing a “secret” encryption algorithm and using that
along with keys is not as secure a process as using a public and robust algorithm
and keeping the keys separate because the are two secrets in the secret encryption
algorithm scheme—one is the actual key and the other is the encryption algorithm
itself. In the scheme using a public and robust algorithm, there is only one secret—the
key itself.
5.4.13 Defense in depth is not necessary.
People who hold this misconception think that a single defense is sufficient. How-
ever, relying on a single perimeter (or other) defense makes that defense a single point
of failure. Since nothing is completely secure, it’s possible that defense will fail, in
which case there will be no other security mechanisms. In contrast, defense in depth
means having multiple overlapping layers of security. By having defense in depth, a
single layer defense failing doesn’t mean the whole system is compromised – hopefully
an additional defense will still provide protection.
5.4.14 I can trust my users to not be malicious.
People who hold this misconception trust that users or other “upstream” data
sources will only provide harmless input. Users—either purposely or just through
chance—may provide input that breaks the expected flow of the program. However,
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instead of trusting input, if input is treated as malicious “until proven innocent” by
validating and sanitizing it before use, dangerous input cannot cause bad outcomes.
Additionally, because of this process, normal users with unusual input are likely to
get a better experience, as the program will always perform as expected.
5.4.15 I have nothing to hide, so privacy isn’t important to
me.
What people who suffer this misconception fail to realize is that by giving up
the right to privacy now, they are surrendering that right in the future, if they ever
need or want it. They may also fail to realize that, by devaluing their own privacy,
they may be making it harder for others to keep theirs. Individuals often do have
information they would like to keep private, although they might not think about it
or be aware of it. Data can also be in a different form than users typically identify
with as personal information, such as values, interests, and other indirect information.
Users fail to realize the importance of indirect personal information, which can be
used to target advertising at them without their explicit consent.
5.4.16 Encryption automatically provides integrity and/or
authenticity.
People who hold this misconception believe that encryption automatically provides
integrity or authenticity along with confidentiality, while this is not always the case.
Symmetric encryption algorithms used for confidentiality, such as AES, do provide
integrity or authenticity in their most basic modes of operation. Authenticity is not
provided because anyone with the AES key (which must be shared by its very nature)
can send an encrypted message, and you cannot verify who sent it. Integrity is not
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provided because a message’s ciphertext can be modified in transit; decrypting it
will result in data being produced which is not the plaintext, but no mechanism will
identify this change. Instead, people needing authenticity and/or integrity should use
cryptography designed for this purpose.
5.4.17 The inconvenience of Two Factor Authentication out-
weighs its security benefits.
People who hold this misconception see Two Factor Authentication (2FA) as not
being worthwhile, possibly because they do not understand how, and the extent to
which, it makes attacks against authentication harder. They also might underestimate
the value of their data or their likelihood of being a target, which may make the
hassle of 2FA seem unnecessary and wasteful. Two factor authentication may be
inconvenient, but it provides a much stronger form of authentication by requiring both
something the user knows (usually their login credentials of username and password)
and something the user has (usually a cell phone or device). While it may be easy to
steal one of the two factors, it’s simply much harder to steal both. It’s also impractical
to steal both factors on a large scale (you might be able to steal a database with
millions of passwords, but it’s not possible to also steal all those users’ phones). If
we recognize that 2FA makes authentication attacks meaningfully harder, and we
recognize the value of our data and access, then 2FA is a strategy worth considering
very carefully.
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6 Discussion
Our findings appear reasonable at face value. Retrospectively, however, there are
several things we would try to improve if doing similar work. In particular, we would
try to improve the coding process and consider our survey expert selection process
and questions. These retrospective observations are discussed in this section.
6.1 Coding Process
Our coding process was non-standard in that each coder generated their own list
of codes and coded all the data, then came up with a standardized list of codes.
This approach was problematic in that different coders defined a different number of
codes, and some split up a concept where others had more overarching concepts as
one code. This deviation from standard coding practices was likely a contributing
factor in our relatively low inter-rater reliability, as lower-supported misconceptions
were often only supported by a single coder. We believe our results are still strong
despite this reliability metric, especially when looking at the similar support counts
all coders had for the top supported misconceptions.
Coders were given vague instructions at the start of the coding process with the
intent of reducing the influence of instructions on their final coding. However, these
instructions were inadequate, as one coder performed the coding in such a way that
it was incompatible with the rest of the coding, and their coding were not considered
as a result. Their codes generally supported our findings, but were not used in this
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study.
Our coding process also did not include any student interviews when coming up
with the codes or their descriptions. However, student interviews are planned with
students who take an alpha version of the concept inventory.
6.2 Survey
Survey questions can often influence responses in some way, and this may have
happened in this study. Our top two misconceptions concern people fundamentally
misunderstanding the limitations of cryptography and people not considering physical
security. Two survey questions specifically asked about these fields (cryptography
and physical security), and many of the responses can be summarized as “they didn’t
consider it”. It’s likely that having any categorical questions would have had this same
effect, which was something we didn’t consider when trying to jog expert’s memories
of common security mistakes. We believe these misconceptions are highly important,
so while they can be correlated closely with the survey questions, it not certain they
were directly caused by the survey questions and it does not seem unreasonable that
they are the top two.
The low response rate may be due to our method of selecting academic experts. We
tried to find contact information for all the authors from the conferences mentioned
above. However, many of these authors may have been graduate students when the
papers were published, and might no longer be checking those email addresses or even
working in the security field. A more narrowly targeted approach may have yielded
a better response rate and more responses even if it did not find contact information
for so many experts.
The low response rate might also have been improved by changing the survey.
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While the survey was designed with a balance between highly specific and overly
broad questions in mind, it may have been possible to jog people’s memory while only
asking a single open-ended question. The question might have asked ”What are some
common security mistakes you have observed in your work? Some areas of computer
security to jog your memory are network security, application security, data security
and encryption, physical security, information privacy, and access control. Please
write down as many common mistakes you can think of, whether or not they fall into
the above categories”. This would leave only one question for respondents to answer,
which may make them more willing to complete the survey. On the other hand, some
of the survey respondents complained that the questions were too vague and difficult
to answer. Further reducing the number of questions might cause more participants
to encounter this issue. Including all the prompts above that one question might help
with this issue, but there is not a clear best approach for asking these questions.
The only demographic question whose responses we considered in this part of the
project was the years of security experience. The other questions may be considered
in later parts of this project. However, if they end up not being considered, it would
be good to remove such unnecessary questions from the survey in the future to make
the survey as short and easy to take as possible. Additionally, a number of respon-
dents worried that their responses to the demographic questions could be used to
de-anonymize their responses. These questions were all optional, but removing them
entirely would also alleviate this concern.
6.3 Coding Results
It is important to note that our process did not produce an objective, compre-
hensive list of the most common security misconceptions. Rather, we have taken a
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snapshot in time of the experiences of 88 security experts. If this same work was
repeated with different experts, we might see a somewhat different set of miscon-
ceptions on the final list. The coding process is also influenced to some degree by
the coders own experiences. The coding process is a mixture of both hard and soft
science, not an entirely objective process. However, it is a good method for giving
some objectivity to purely subjective data (the survey responses). While some of the
misconceptions may change if the work was repeated, a valid concept inventory can
be created from this data, because the concept inventory is not a comprehensive test
of the field. Rather, it is a sampling of common concepts analogous to a final exam
in a class, where not all the concepts are covered.
This work was concerned with finding the most common security misconceptions.
These are the list of top supported misconceptions we found. However, many of the
misconceptions that did not make that list are still interesting misconceptions that
are worth considering. For instance, one such misconception is the idea that security
can be sprinkled in after a product is developed, instead of being part of the design.
Another interesting misconception is that people fail to consider insider threats. The
idea that an overly complex security system is more secure than one that is more
simple is another noteworthy thing that was mentioned, but not highly supported in
our data.
Some of the misconceptions that ended up being highly supported are somewhat
surprising, like the last one about Two Factor Authentication. As a whole, however,
the list of misconceptions appears to be a reasonable list. This list will be sent to
some survey respondents who volunteered to look over the list of misconceptions for
face validity in future work related to this project.
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7 Future Work
A concept inventory consisting of the top supported misconceptions is being de-
veloped and is in the alpha phase, having been given to around 40 outgoing computer
security students at the University of Minnesota Duluth. The concept inventory cur-
rently consists of 20 open-ended stems, and student responses will be used to create
distractors and develop future versions of the inventory. This inventory will eventu-
ally be a validated instrument used for identifying students’ understanding of the top
misconceptions identified as part of this project.
A curriculum, consisting of educational videos and lab exercises is also being
developed to target common misconceptions.
For each misconception, a hands-on or interactive activity will be created that
demonstrates how the misconception is wrong and the right way of thinking about the
misconception. These exercises will be for in-class or homework use and will include
activity manuals and all supporting materials. These exercises will be available online
and instructors will be able to choose which exercises are appropriate to assign to their
students.
Videos will visually describe the misconception, why it is the wrong way of think-
ing, and the proper way of thinking about it. Videos will include examples of the
misconception, whether they are real-world examples or a theoretical explanation.
These videos will be publicly available and will be supplementary material for the
lab exercises, but will not specifically describe the lab exercises, and instead focus on
describing the misconception more generally.
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8 Conclusions
Addressing common security misconceptions and developing educational tools to
remedy them will improve the state of computer security. This work identifies common
security misconceptions by surveying experts and coding the responses. Using 38 total
codes, four coders coded the responses of the 88 survey respondents, ending up with
a list of 17 highly supported misconceptions.
For each misconception, we have written a succinct statement of the misconception
along with an explanation of the misconception and the correct way of thinking.
At least one open-ended question was developed for each misconception to gather
incorrect understandings of concepts to guide the future concept inventory.
This work is the first step in creating a misconception-based concept inventory
and curriculum for computer security. Future steps will include the completion and
validation of the concept inventory, along with the development of exercises and
educational videos to accompany them.
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A Appendix
A.1 Full Survey Text
Fundamental Computer Security Misconceptions
We are conducting research (NSF #1821788) to identify what security experts
believe are significant, pernicious, important, or intuitive fundamental misconceptions
held or mistakes made by security novices. A classic example from physics is that
people commonly believe that a bowling ball will fall faster than a baseball, because
it is heavier. In reality, gravity doesn’t work that way, and reasoning based on that
model will result in errors.
What we want to know is: What are the analogous beliefs that people have about
computer security? Once we have a list of these misconceptions, we will be creating a
test of those concepts along with active learning exercises to teach them to beginning
security students. That’s where you come in. In the context of seven areas of security
– networking, applications, data security / encryption, physical security [as it relates
to information security], privacy, access control, and a catch-all ”other” area – we’d
like you to describe what you have observed as common or critical misconceptions
or mistakes in that area, and, if you can, describe why you think people hold those
misconceptions or make those mistakes.
The survey ends with a short set of (optional) demographic questions about ex-
perience, employment and education.
Please note:
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• The ”areas of security” are only meant only to help you think broadly about
security. Your responses will not be sorted by area, so if the prompts are
unhelpful to you, feel free to put your answers under ”other” or disregard the
areas.
• Multiple answers per area are welcome.
• You are encouraged to leave fields blank according to your preference; any
response will be helpful.
• For more information about our survey design, please see:
https://secmisco.blogspot.com/2018/11/survey-design.html
* Required Informed Consent and IRB Information Investigator: Dr. Peter A.
H. Peterson – pahp@d.umn.edu
Eligibility: Participants must be at least 18 years old.
Overall Description of Participation:
It is your choice to take this survey or not, you can stop at any time, and you can
skip any question on the survey you cannot or do not wish to answer. If you choose
to participate, you will take a short survey (5-20 minutes depending on how much
you choose to write) where you describe misconceptions about computer security
that you believe are held by computer security novices. The survey asks the same
question about misconceptions in several areas of security (and a catch-all ”other”
area). Following this, there is a short demographics survey about security expertise.
This is NOT a test of your expertise in security. Again, you are encouraged to skip
any question you cannot or do not wish to answer.
What will this data be used for?
We will use this data to create a list of common misconceptions. Based on that list,
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we will create a test covering a set of those misconceptions, and hands-on exercises
and videos targeting the most common or important misconceptions. We will publish
anonymized and aggregate results to help the security community, and our educational
materials will be made available for free online. Risks and Benefits of Participation:
No unusual risks or discomfort are expected from taking this survey (although
some people find it challenging to articulate generic misconceptions in computer se-
curity). Benefits of participating may include enjoying the process of identifying
misconceptions, and good feelings about contributing to research to improve security
education and, hopefully, to improve future computer security.
Confidentiality and Data Use Statement: Survey responses to this Google Form
will be stored in a Google Doc nominally accessible only to the project team. Your
responses will be treated as confidential. Data will only be released in an aggregate
rewritten form; your own words will not be released without further written permis-
sion from you. If you choose to provide your email address, it will only be used
for follow-up questions relating to the survey (e.g., to ask for clarification or to ask
to use your words verbatim). Your email address will not be released in any form.
All email addresses in the survey results will be deleted from the stored data after
the project is over. Responses will not be aggregated by respondent, but aggregated
with other similar misconceptions in order to identify the most commonly mentioned
misconceptions.
IRB Approval / Exemption: This portion of our project has been deemed by the
UMN IRB as not involving ”human subjects,” and thus does not require approval OR
an exemption, because, while it is 1) systematic research 2) meant to be generalize-
able, it does NOT 3) involve personal AND identifiable information.
Check all that apply.
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1. I consent to my responses being used as part of this study.
2. What are one or more of the most common and important misconceptions or
mistakes in network security?
3. Why do you believe these misconceptions or mistakes occur?
4. What are one or more of the most common and important misconceptions or
mistakes in application security?
5. Why do you believe these misconceptions or mistakes occur?
6. What are one or more of the most common and important misconceptions or
mistakes in data security and encryption?
7. Why do you believe these misconceptions or mistakes occur?
8. What are one or more of the most common and important misconceptions or
mistakes in physical security (as it relates to information security)?
9. Why do you believe these misconceptions or mistakes occur?
10. What are one or more of the most common and important misconceptions or
mistakes in information privacy?
11. Why do you believe these misconceptions or mistakes occur?
12. What are one or more of the most common and important misconceptions or
mistakes in access control?
13. Why do you believe these misconceptions or mistakes occur?
14. Can you think of any other security misconceptions or mistakes you have ob-
served (in any area of computer security)?
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15. Why do you believe these misconceptions or mistakes occur?
Demographics and Experience (optional) Information security is a field populated by
people with a wide variety of experiences, employment and educational backgrounds.
This optional demographic information will help us understand the backgrounds and
expertise of respondents.
16. Job title
17. What is your highest level of education? Mark only one oval. Less than high
school Some high school High school diploma or GED Some undergraduate
education Undergraduate diploma (2 or 4-year) Some graduate school Master’s
degree (or equivalent) PhD (or equivalent) Other:
18. What degrees or certifications do you have (if any)?
19. What was/were your major(s)/minor(s) (if any)?
20. In what sector do you work, primarily? Mark only one oval. Education Industry
Government Defense Other:
21. What is your primary job responsibility? Mark only one oval. Educating others
Security research Applied security Consulting Other:
22. How many years of information security experience do you have? Mark only
one oval. <1 1-5 6-10 11-15 16-20 21-25 >25 I do not have meaningful security
experience.
23. Please enter your email address if you’re willing to receive follow-up communi-
cation about this survey.
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Thank you!
We really appreciate you taking the time to help us by providing your responses.
We’ll do our best to make the substantive results from this study public, and to create
educational tools and materials to help remediate these important misconceptions.
For more information about our project, please see: https://secmisco.blogspot.com/
If you have any questions, concerns, or comments about this survey, please contact:
Dr. Peter A. H. Peterson at pahp@d.umn.edu.
Thanks again!
A.2 Open-ended Stems
1. Suppose you’re visiting a website and there is a signal in the interface (e.g., a
green lock in the address bar) that signifies an encrypted connection. What is
one reason why the connection might not be secure, even though it is encrypted?
[5.4.1]
2. A facility stores extremely sensitive data on servers that are disconnected from
the Internet. They are developing a new security policy. Given that the com-
puters are disconnected from the Internet, and knowing that attacks exist to
target air-gapped systems like this, what is the most critical component of the
security policy? [5.4.2]
3. What makes someone a poor target for a social engineering attack (a security-
related scam)? [5.4.3]
4. Alice determines that a random, 16-character password will take decades to
crack. As a result, Alice creates one such password and uses it for all of her
accounts. Explain why this is a bad strategy. [5.4.4]
42
5. Your neighbors have been stealing your WiFi, so you purchased and installed
a brand new WiFi router from a well-known company for your home. After
plugging it in, you’re able to use the WiFi to access to the Internet. Why is it
unlikely that this will solve your problem? [5.4.5]
6. Operating Systems are supposed to be secure. Why do these programs require
regular updates? [5.4.7]
7. A company has two divisions: Widgets and Gizmos . A new intern has been
assigned to the Widget division to examine the Widget design procedure for
compliance and talk to her manager about any violations. Later in the summer,
she will be assigned to update manuals in the Gizmo division. To do her work,
she needs permissions to files. Read permissions means that a user can read
files for a given division. Write permissions means that a user can modify or
create files for a given division.
You are the system administrator and need to assign her file permissions today.
What permissions (read, write, none, or both) should be assigned to her for
each division (Widgets and Gizmos)? [5.4.10]
8. Suppose that a large social network, such as Facebook, made all its data pub-
licly available, but anonymized in the following way: All real-world personal
or geographic identifiers, such as real names, phone numbers, social security
numbers, birth dates, zip codes, cities, states, and so on, would be modified by
replacing them with a specific identifier for each unique category of informa-
tion. For example, everyone living in London would have their ”city” replaced
with the same random number (so that the relationships in the network are
still intact).
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Suppose you were given this data set. Using your real-world resources, is there
any legal way you could identify an acquaintance’s profile? Why or why not?
[5.4.11]
9. What’s one reason why the computers of typical home users are not valuable
to cyber attackers? [5.4.3]
10. Oh no! Someone just leaked your company’s encryption algorithm and now
anybody can decrypt your company’s secrets! After the breach, you are tasked
with re-implementing the encryption system that your company uses to be more
resilient to such leaks. How does your new system prevent a similar leak from
being so catastrophic in the future? [5.4.12]
11. Why do anti-malware companies like McAfee and Avast push out updates so
frequently? [5.4.8]
12. Sally is the network administrator for the network at GlobalDyne, a defense
contractor. GlobalDyne’s network has top of the line defenses to protect against
leaks, including a firewall with deep packet inspection, mandatory access control
on all files, security guards, encrypted backups and least privilege access control
policies. Nevertheless, multiple high-profile leaks have occurred. How could this
be happening? [5.4.13]
13. An intern has been added to your team with the assignment of implementing
the encryption module for your application. What advice would you give them
regarding the encryption algorithm? [5.4.13]
14. What is the best thing you can do to improve the security of a laptop that must
regularly be turned off and stored somewhere where it might get stolen? [5.4.1]
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15. Even though it is in space and unconnected to the Internet, the ISS (Interna-
tional Space Station) computers have been infected with malware. How could
this happen? [5.4.2]
16. Consider this pseudocode:
1 func t i on f i nd ( dir , name) {
2 L i s t = system . run ( ” l s ” + d i r )
3 For f i l e in l i s t {
4 I f ”name” in f i l e {
5 Return f i l e
6 }
7 }
8 }
Assuming that the functions used in the code do not, themselves, have any
security flaws, what is the most critical flaw in find()? [5.4.14]
17. A team is developing a new device including its software. What’s the best way
for them to make sure that the product they ship is as secure as possible? [5.4.7]
18. A network of wireless sensors in an airplane needs to periodically send four
unsigned 32 bit values (128 bits total) to a central control computer over a
potentially hostile network. When the messages arrive at the computer, there
is no source information included in the header, so the message itself must
somehow identify the sender.
Consider the following design proposal: Each sensor has a unique symmetric en-
cryption key, which is hard-coded into the sensor and and the central computer
at installation time. Messages from the sensors are encrypted using a strong
cipher in the basic ECB (Electronic Code Book) mode, resulting in two 128-bit
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blocks of ciphertext (the second block is padding). When messages arrive at
the central computer, the computer decrypts new messages with every sensor
key until this process results in a valid message. This achieves both decryption
and identification of the sender.
What is the worst problem with this design? [5.4.16]
19. You are developing a system that uses user-defined passwords. You’ve al-
ready implemented best practices for password storage and testing (a password-
specific hash function and salts) but you’d like the authentication system to be
more secure. How could you improve the system? [5.4.17]
20. Assuming your browser has no known vulnerabilities, what is the greatest dan-
ger to you, the user, when accessing unencrypted websites? [5.4.1]
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